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Abstract: Two explanations for discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland are threat to 
secularization and xenophobia.  We conducted lost letter experiments and find that distinctively 
religious Muslim groups are indeed discriminated against, although not to a larger degree 
than Christian sects.  Moreover, discrimination against Muslims decreases when there is no 
reference to religiousness.  In sum, the discrimination against Muslims seems mainly to be a 
result of distinctive religious characteristics attributed to this group.
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Islamophobie oder Säkularisierung? Lost-Letter-Experimente zur Diskriminierung 
von Muslimen in einer urbanen Region der Schweiz
Zusammenfassung: Zwei mögliche Erklärungen für die Diskriminierung von Muslimen sind 
der Threat-to-Secularization-Ansatz und Xenophobie. Resultate von Lost-Letter-Experimenten 
legen nahe, dass distinktiv religiöse muslimische Gruppen tatsächlich diskriminiert werden, 
aber nicht stärker als christliche Sekten. Weiter ist die Diskriminierung von Muslimen 
deutlich seltener, wenn kein Hinweis auf Religiosität vorliegt. Zusammenfassend scheint die 
Diskriminierung von Muslimen vor allem auf die distinktive Religiosität zurückzuführen zu 
sein, welche dieser Gruppe zugeschrieben wird.
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Islamophobie ou menace pour la sécularization ? L’expérience de la « lettre 
 perdue » et la discrimination contre les musulmans en Suisse dans des  
contextes  urbains suisses
Résumé : Deux explications à la discrimination des musulmans sont la menace pour la sécula-
rization et la xénophobie. En menant l’expérience de la « lettre perdue », nous avons constaté 
que des groupes religieux musulmans distincts font l’objet de discriminations, mais pas 
dans une plus grande mesure que les sectes chrétiennes. En outre, la discrimination contre 
les musulmans diminue lorsqu’il n’y a pas de référence à la religiosité. En résumé, la discri-
mination des musulmans semble être principalement due à des caractéristiques religieuses 
distinctes attribuées à ce groupe.
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1 Introduction1
Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims and the potential difficulties of in-
tegrating Muslims into secularized societies are important political topics.  Especially 
since the refugee crisis, but in most European countries long before, the topic has 
had special relevance.  This is particularly the case in Switzerland.  Already in 2009, 
Swiss voters accepted the so-called “Minaret Initiative,” which aimed at prohibiting 
mosques from building new minarets.  Following the passing of this initiative, there 
was broad debate whether and why the Swiss are particularly islamophobic.  Public 
opinion polls before the vote forecast a clear rejection, but the initiative was unex-
pectedly passed by the Swiss voters.  After the vote, the public discussion focused 
on whether the Muslim population of Switzerland was really discriminated against 
as much as the result of the vote suggested.  And if so, how this could be explained.
There were two main explanatory approaches for the votes result.  Both are 
a form of the “identity approach of discrimination.” The first explanation was the 
strong secular attitude of the Swiss voters.  According to this interpretation, mina-
rets were not banned because they were a symbol of a foreign group, but rather 
as a public symbol of a religion that does not clearly confine itself to the private 
sphere, but also has political aims.  Such forms of religions are rejected by most of 
the Swiss voters, because they are perceived as a menace to the secular Swiss state 
when religious and secular values become opposed (e. g. with religious vs. secular 
schooling).  From this point of view, it is not the aspect of a foreign group that leads 
to discrimination, but the explicit religiousness and anti-secular aspect of that group 
(cf. Koopmans 2014; van der Noll and Saroglou 2015).  If this holds true, similar 
domestic religious groups – namely fundamentalist Christian sects with political 
aims – should be discriminated against, too (cf. Joppke 2015).  We label this form 
of the identity approach the “threat to secularization” explanation.
The second explanation for the prohibition of new minarets in Switzerland was 
that the Swiss voters are prejudiced against Muslims.  Islamophobic attitudes were 
said to be the expression of the xenophobia of Swiss natives.  Therefore, people with 
Muslim background who show no reference to religiousness should be discriminated 
against as much as distinctively religious Muslims.  Following Stolz (2000; 2005) we 
label this form of the identity approach the “traditional world-view” explanation.
This paper uses a so-called “lost letters” design to test which approach offers a 
better explanation.  The “lost letters” design measures real behavior in the field, while 
the “participants” of the study do not know that they are observed.  Therefore, there 
is no social desirability bias and thus, the behavior is a good indicator of discrimina-
tory behavior.  The basis of discriminatory behavior are prejudices which represent 
the attitude of a person.  Attitudes must be measured with surveys.  If attitudes are 
1 Thanks: We thank Benedict Borer, Lenzi Brandenberger, Heidi Bruderer Enzler, Friederike 
Eberlein, Laura Klüpfel and Simon Kunz.
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prone to social desirability, which is the case with prejudices, their measurement 
might be biased because respondents try to conceal their prejudice.  This process of 
people concealing their true attitude towards the building of minarets is likely to 
have happened during the polls before the “minaret initiative.” Consequently, the 
results of the polls were inaccurate. 
One could argue that because nobody will express a socially undesirable 
prejudice and not act correspondingly, this could be seen at least as a measure of 
the minimum level of discrimination.  However, this aspect is not essential, because 
attitudes do not necessarily translate into behavior.  For instance, already LaPiere 
(1934) gives an example of racial prejudices against Asians being freely stated, but 
he also demonstrated that this did not result in racial discrimination.  It follows that 
reported prejudices cannot even be interpreted as the minimal level of discrimination. 
Therefore, discrimination is best measured by examining actual behavior.  This is 
not only true from a methodological, but also from a practical point of view.  It is 
more important to learn about actual discriminatory behavior than about prejudices 
alone.  Therefore, a lost letters design is well-suited for measuring discrimination 
against Muslims or religious groups, respectively.
Typically, this advantage of the lost letters designs of measuring discrimination 
in a non-reactive manner comes at the cost of not knowing who is discriminating. 
Due to a methodological novelty we were able to overcome this flaw of the lost 
letters designs.  We used windshield wipers of cars as losing places and could gain 
information about the car holders and therefore potential finders of the lost letters 
from the license plates of the cars.
2 Theory
The theoretical analysis starts with the definition of prejudice, discrimination, and 
Islamophobia.  Then we present two explanations for Islamophobia and anti-Muslim 
discrimination that are based on the identity approach.
2.1 Definitions
We use the following textbook definitions of prejudice, discrimination and Islamo-
phobia (e. g. Darity 2008).
Prejudice.  A prejudice is the affective component of a socially biased belief 
about some social group.  The cognitive component of such a belief is called a 
stereotype.  First, this means that a prejudice does not map some objective social 
reality but is generated by some social or social psychological process.  Second, and 
more important for our analysis, a prejudice is not deliberately controlled.  Rather, 
prejudices are – at least partly – unconscious, emotionally laden, and not acces-
sible to rational persuasion.  Third, a prejudice is an attitude and not a behavior. 
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Prejudices are not necessarily negative (e. g. “Asians are good at math”), although 
generally they tend to be.
Discrimination.  The behavioral component of a prejudice is called discrimi-
nation.  Such discriminating behavior is driven by the affective social bias aspect 
of prejudice.  If a prejudice is negatively biased, discriminatory acts could include 
verbal degradation or even violent aggression.  Because discriminating behavior is 
driven by an emotionally laden prejudice, it is not controlled by rational arguments.
Islamophobia.  Darity (2008) defines Islamophobia as a special form of xeno-
phobia.  Xenophobia is a prejudice against foreign groups.  A group can be foreign 
on different dimensions.  In its simplest form xenophobia is directed to a previously 
unknown social group.  Very often this is a group of newly immigrated people.  In 
this case, foreign might also signify a foreign appearance (e. g., skin color, outfit) or 
a foreign religion, like the Islam. 
Therefore, we define Islamophobia as prejudiced and discriminating behavior 
that is directed against people that are perceived as having a Muslim background 
(hereinafter shortened to “Muslim”).  This means that we distinguish Islamophobia 
from xenophobia which is directed against all foreigners, as well as from racism 
which relies on racial differences like skin color.
This differentiation is plausible for several reasons: first, it follows analytically 
from the above presented categories.  Second, it is congruent with allegations from 
Muslims that they are discriminated against as a religious group.  Third, this differ-
entiation allows adequate interventions: if Islamophobia coincided with xenophobia, 
effective political interventions will have to be different from those that might be 
applied if Islamophobia is different from xenophobia.
2.2 The identity approach for the explanation of discrimination
We use the identity approach to explain potential discrimination against Muslims 
in Switzerland.  This approach starts from the assumption that people strive for a 
social identity.  Therefore, they want to be part of some group – the in-group.  The 
in-group needs to have distinct characteristics that make it distinguishable.  In 
principle, this comparison can function on any dimension, as soon as the out-group 
is perceived as relevant.  The compared characteristics do not have to be relevant. 
They can be mere names, like in the minimal-group experiment of Billig and Tajfel 
(1973, cf. also Sherif et al. 1955).  The characteristics can even be completely im-
agined, as with Jewish out-groups in situations where there are no Jews at all.  But 
the out-group characteristics can also be manifest.  Typically, the perception of the 
out-group is socially biased.  This allows a better promotion of the in-group over the 
out-group, which in turn leads to discrimination.  The demand to stabilize social 
identity by discriminating against an out-group arises when the in-group members 
perceive themselves as being threatened.  This corresponds directly to the foregoing 
definition of xenophobia as a prejudice against a foreign, that is to say, out-group.
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This raises the question of, which social group in Switzerland might express a 
desire to discriminate against other groups, and why they should choose Muslims 
as an out-group.  A precise interpretation of the identity approach must follow 
Stolz’ advice to “distinguish[…] the different groups in society that have […] vary-
ing attitudes to different out-groups” (2005, 550).  We suggest two answers to this 
question.  First, the traditionalist world-views as a classical explanation, and second 
the “threat to secularization” approach, especially taking certain historical, political 
and social properties of Switzerland into account.
2.2.1 Traditionalist world-view approach
Following Stolz (2000; 2005), one can assume a traditionalist world-view as a 
conservative attitude.  Traditionalist persons perceive change itself or anything 
new as a threat.  Muslims, then, might serve as an out-group, because they are a 
new phenomenon in Swiss society.  Still, it remains unclear who exactly could be 
likely to take up the position of a traditionalist world-view.  What is sure, however, 
is that it must be a group of people who perceive themselves as being native Swiss. 
Rather vague, but testable with our empirical approach, the following hypothesis 
can be stated.
HT 1: Native Swiss discriminate against Muslims more than people that do not have a 
native Swiss background.
2.2.2 Threat to secularization approach
From the identity approach it follows that in certain dimensions, the in-group will 
construct differences from an out-group.  In principle, the dimension itself does not 
matter.  But, of course, one can consider certain dimensions that might commonly 
be the subject of the construction of differences.
One major dimension of the Swiss identity is secularism.2 The founding of 
modern Switzerland in 1848 was to a substantial degree the result of the liberal and 
anticlerical movement in the protestant cantons, which culminated in a civil war 
(«Sonderbundskrieg») that was won by the liberal side.  Unsurprisingly, the consoli-
dation of the new federation was accompanied by further conflicts between secular 
and religious forces.  So, in 1874, by popular vote, the Jesuit order was outlawed, 
together with a ban on new monasteries and dioceses.3 Clerics were not allowed 
to be members of one of the chambers of the national parliament («Nationalrat»). 
As a consequence of these historical processes, the political power of religious 
groups  – especially of the two main denominations of Switzerland, the Roman 
2 The following historical facts about Swiss history can be found e. g. in the online-version of the 
«Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz» (historical dictionary of Switzerland, http://www.hls-dhs-dss.
ch/).
3 A lot of monasteries and other clerical institutions had already been abolished during the revolu-
tion of 1848.
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Catholic Church4 and the Protestant church – were and are strongly restricted and 
controlled by the state.  So, in most Swiss cantons there is a system of publicly 
recognized churches.5 Thus, other religious groups are potentially not legitimated 
(cf. Pahud de Mortanges 2007).  They are perceived as – often fundamentalist – 
sects in the sense of Weber (1920).  Similar things happened in several European 
countries (cf. «Kulturkampf») around this time (Marx 2003).  But in Switzerland 
it was not until 1973 that the ban on the Jesuit order was withdrawn by another 
popular vote.  The exclusion of clerics from the parliament was not abolished until 
1999, and the ban on new dioceses as recently as 2001.  Also, due to a referendum, 
kosher butchering has been banned in Switzerland since 1893.  The banning of new 
minarets by the popular vote of 2009 is in line with such anti-religious movements 
in Switzerland.  In addition to this historical evidence, a high degree of secularism 
and regulation of religious issues in Switzerland has also been identified by recent 
quantitative studies (Fox 2008; 2012).6
Therefore, Muslims might be seen as a non-secular and not publicly recognized 
religious out-group with values that threaten the secular values and institutions of the 
Swiss society and state.  Indeed, Muslims lack an overarching religious organization 
like e. g. the Roman Catholic Church, or the publicly recognized reformed churches 
in Switzerland.  Instead Muslims are divided into many different groups with very 
diverging aims.  Here we call such groups fundamentalist religious groups (cf. e. g. 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).  In this case, and in line with the above definition, 
discrimination against Muslims is not the result of general xenophobia, but rather 
of the discrimination against a foreign – namely fundamentalist – form of religion.7 
This “threat to secularization approach” now implies several testable hypotheses.  The 
first simply states that religious groups outside the publicly recognized churches are 
discriminated against compared to non-religious groups:
HS 2: Fundamentalist religious groups are discriminated against more than secular groups.
This already implies that from the viewpoint of the “threat to secularization ap-
proach” the kind of religion itself does not matter.  This leads to the next hypothesis:
4 For the most populated diocese of Switzerland (Basel), the included cantons have the right to 
veto against new bishops.
5 The relationships between the state and religious groups, and churches respectively, is – as many 
other issues – governed on the level of cantons.  As a consequence, in Switzerland, there exist dif-
ferent publicily recognized churches with differing legal implementations.  Therefore we restricted 
our field work to one canton (Zurich, see below).
6 Switzerland is not a complete exception as compared to e. g. other OECD countries, but rather 
a typical example for a group of European countries with a longstanding tradition of secularism 
and governmental regulation of religion like, e. g., England, France and Scandinavia.  For reasons 
of space we cannot extend this argument systematically.
7 This explanation allows also for discrimination against Swiss native converts.  This case, though 
not very frequent, is highly visible in the public because these converts are often strongly involved 
in the religion, as preachers and the like. 
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HS 3: Religious Muslim groups are discriminated against as much as distinctively fun-
damentalist religious – namely Christian – groups.
Discrimination of Muslims should disappear if they display no sign of fundamentalist 
religiousness.  This leads to the following hypothesis. 
HS 4: Non-religious Muslims are not discriminated against.
On the contrary, if Swiss natives show signs of fundamentalist religiousness they 
are also discriminated against.
HS 5: Distinctively fundamentalist religious Swiss natives are discriminated against.
One would expect that people benefiting from the modern secular Swiss state, or, 
in contrast, are derogated by fundamentalist religious groups, should have a pro-
pensity to discriminate against religious groups.  Such people could be women in 
general, homosexuals, animal right activists (e. g. due to the kosher butchering), 
and many more.  We will not be able to identify such individual characteristics with 
our empirical approach – except for the sex of the individuals.  Indeed, Stolz et al. 
(2016) find that people with feminist values tend to have a critical view of Islam. 
This leads to the last testable hypothesis.
HS 6: Women discriminate more against religious groups than men.
2.3 Evidence relating to discrimination against Muslims with a focus on Switzerland
Yet there exists hardly any evidence relating to the presented hypotheses.  Some 
reasons for this were already addressed by Stolz (2005).  He identifies several epis-
temological problems that must be dealt with in every research on Islamophobia. 
Two of them are of special interest here, namely: “[T]he problem of the distinction 
of Islamophobia and legitimate political opinion” (Stolz 2005, 549), and “[t] he 
problem of distinguishing Islamophobia from other types of stereotype-driven at-
titudes and/or actions” (Stolz 2005, 550).  This is important here, because to test 
the postulated hypotheses we must precisely differentiate between secular attitudes, 
xenophobia and Islamophobia.  In addition, we must distinguish discriminating 
behavior from reported attitudes.  Because respondents might perceive xenophobia 
and Islamophobia as socially undesirable they will underreport it.  But, as already 
mentioned above, the opposite might also happen. 
Thus, most of the existing literature on Islamophobia does not apply to our 
hypotheses.  Nevertheless, there is literature that gives some insight into discrimina-
tion against Muslim groups in Switzerland.  In particular we will review the literature 
on Islamophobia in Switzerland on the interplay of Islamophobia and secularism, 
and on discrimination against Muslims.  Stolz (2005) finds that Islamophobia is 
only one of several out-group phobias reported by Swiss inhabitants of the city of 
Zurich.  Prejudices about Muslims seem to be correlated with a traditionalist world-
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view.  This world-view subsumes prejudices against different foreign out-groups, of 
which Muslims are only one, and is driven by rapid social changes.  Therefore, this 
finding corroborates the xenophobia approach on the level of attitudes.  Similarly, 
Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) find that opposition to naturalization of Muslim 
foreigners in Switzerland is mainly driven by xenophobia.
There is also evidence for the “threat to secularization” approach.  Helbling 
(2014) concludes that people in Western Europe make a distinction between Muslims 
as a group and the Muslim headscarf as a distinctively religious symbol associated 
with anti-liberal values.  To some extent, Helbling attributes this to a growing decline 
of religion in general.  However, decline of the headscarf and general Islamophobia 
are both also connected with xenophobia.  So, to a certain degree, the xenophobia 
approach is also supported.  Similarly, van der Noll and Saroglou (2015) find that 
attitudes against Islamic education in Germany are driven by anti-religious attitudes 
and to some part also by xenophobia.  This finding is even stronger in East-Germany 
which has a stronger secular tradition than West-Germany.  Note that this literature 
studies attitudes (prejudices, in our terms) but not discrimination.  In addition to 
that, Stolz et al. (2016), using survey data, find that both conservative individuals and 
individuals embracing secular or feminist values tend to have a critical view of Islam.
There are very few studies directly measuring discriminatory behavior and 
not attitudes – although there is no study based on Swiss data.  Using a lost letter 
experiment (see below) in Stockholm, Ahmed (2010) finds that Muslim persons 
are only discriminated against if there are monetary incentives for discrimination. 
However, there is no hint why discrimination happens.  With no further information, 
this result at best might be interpreted as a support for the finding of Islamophobia. 
With lost letter experiments, Koopmans and Veit (2014) show that in East Berlin 
Islamic groups, but not Turkish groups, are discriminated against.  This pattern is not 
found in West Berlin.  Especially the results for East Germany can be interpreted as 
support for the “threat to secularization” approach.  This approach is also supported 
by Adida et al. (2016).  With an experimental design they find that the distinctive 
religiousness of Muslim migrants is a main driver of discrimination in France.  
Overall, the evidence is ambivalent and points to the coexistence of both mo-
tives for discrimination.  Some studies point to xenophobia and traditionalist values 
as drivers of Muslim discrimination, other studies support the “threat to seculariza-
tion” approach.  The latter is especially the case in studies that examine behavior and 
therefore discrimination, while the former is mainly found in reported attitudes.
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3 Method 
We tested our hypotheses in two consecutive studies, both applying to the lost let-
ter technique.  Therefore, we describe this technique first, and present both studies 
up next.
3.1 The lost letter technique 
Stolz (2005) has advocated experimental designs for research into Islamophobia. 
Indeed, experimental designs have two distinct advantages over ex-post survey 
designs: they measure the real behavior of the subjects and they allow direct causal 
interpretations.  In experimental designs the situation of the control- and the 
treatment group(s) only differ in the treatment(s).  So, all the differences between 
control and treatment group(s) which can be observed must be the result of a causal 
effect of the treatment(s) itself (Shadish et al. 2002).  In addition, field designs with 
covert observation have the advantage of being non-reactive because subjects do 
not realize that they are being observed, so their behavior is not biased.  These are 
the requirements of any design that allows for the testing of causal explanations of 
discrimination.
The lost letter technique (Merritt and Fowler 1948) uses these features as 
follows: addressed and stamped letters get “lost” by the experimenters.  If such a 
letter is sent back, this is interpreted as an act of non-discrimination.  Hence, it is 
assumed that the return rate of letters in a certain population measures the degree 
of discrimination against the addressee in this population.  For this reason, the ad-
dressees of the letters are used as experimental treatments.  Yet, these advantages of 
the lost letter technique come at some cost.  Because of the fully anonymous design, 
participants cannot be surveyed, e. g. in order to get information about their at-
titudes (cf. also the next part).  That is why our theoretical and empirical reasoning 
is focused on observable behavior.
3.2 Design
We implemented the lost letter design as follows.  We kept the letters identical in all 
aspects but the name of the addressees.  In addition, to keep the finding situation 
constant, the letters were distributed in blocks of three (study 1) or four (study 2) 
(one for each experimental treatment and one control address) at the same place. 
This ensures that any unobserved heterogeneity of the finding situation is the same 
for the treatment and for the control letters.  Thus, differences in return rates must 
be caused by the different addressees, and we interpreted these differences as dis-
crimination against the corresponding group and/or person.
We used the known procedure of putting the letters under the windshield wip-
ers of cars with a hand-written post-it note on it (Milgram et al. 1965).  The note 
read “Your letter?  Was lying beside your car.” This procedure possibly increased the 
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probability that the letter would be passed on to a mailbox for reasons of reciproc-
ity.  In addition, putting the letters under windshield wipers prevented them from 
disappearing in the dirt or being torn.  This sampling strategy has a major advantage. 
In the Canton of Zurich, it is legally and technically possible to identify the name 
of the owner of a car from its license plate.  So, we were able to obtain additional 
information about the probable finder of the letter and the car owner, respectively. 
With the help of Gabriele Rodriguez from the Center of Onomastics – which is the 
study of proper names – at the University of Leipzig, we could derive the cultural 
backgrounds of the finders.  This was especially useful with names from the former 
Yugoslavia and Albania, respectively.  While some people from those locations have 
a Christian background (e. g., most Slovenes, Serbs and Croatians), others have a 
Muslim background (e. g., many people from Kosovo and Albania).  We therefore 
were able to categorize all probable finders of the lost letters into three groups, 
namely: native Swiss people, finders of the letters that were of Muslim background 
and the group of people with foreign roots but a Christian background.  This group 
consists mainly of people with Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek background, 
but it also includes German immigrants.  Most of the names that could not be coded 
unambiguously were German or Swiss German (e. g., «Peter Müller»), and were 
put in a separate group.  Because the male and female first names under research 
differ distinctively, with the help of onomastic methods we were also able to derive 
the sex of the car owners from their first names.  With this procedure we obtained 
information about the sex and the cultural background of the finders of the letters. 
Thus, we were able to overcome the ecological fallacy that potentially threatens 
the validity of the findings from lost letter experiments to some degree (cf.  Koopmans 
and Veit 2014).  One could argue that the car owner may not actually be the finder 
of the letter.  Nevertheless, the car owners are a reasonable approximation for the – 
unknown – finders.  Even if not all car owners drove their cars themselves at the 
relevant time, it is probable that a close relative or friend did.  Based on the principle 
of homophily it seems very plausible that these people would have the same cultural 
background as the car owners themselves (McPherson et al. 2001).
4 Study 1: Discrimination against Muslims as a religious group 
In the first experiment we addressed the religious aspects of our theoretical analysis. 
For this, we compared the return rate for letters with a visibly distinct religious 
Muslim group name to those of a corresponding Christian one and both to a neutral 
control group. 
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4.1 Operationalization in study 1
As the name of a Muslim group we selected «Muslimischer Kulturverein Goldene 
Moschee» (Muslim Cultural Club Golden Mosque).  The name of a Christian group, 
«Kirche der Bewahrer des Tempels Jesu Christi» (Church of the Keeper of the Temple 
of Jesus Christ), constituted the second treatment.  We chose these names because 
they unambiguously and immediately could be recognized as religious (“mosque” and 
“church”) Muslim and Christian groups (“Muslim” and “Jesus Christ”), respectively. 
Moreover, the form «Kulturverein» (cultural club) made reference to an often-
chosen denomination of Muslim groups.  The Christian name was unambiguously 
recognizable as a Christian sect, not belonging to one publicly recognized churches 
in Zurich (namely the Reformed Church of the Canton of Zurich and the Roman 
Catholic Church).  This was necessary to test our conjectures regarding the threat to 
secularization approach (especially HS3 and HS5), that Muslim groups are perceived 
as being fundamentalist religious.  A third name of a religiously neutral group was 
used as control group, namely «Verein zur Pflege alter Obstsorten» (Association for 
the Fostering of Ancient Fruit Species).  All three groups, of course, did not exist 
in reality.
For all three groups the same address in the center of the city of Bern was 
used.  Bern, as the capital of Switzerland, is often chosen as a legal address for all 
sorts of associations, which made the address credible. 
It was not planned that finders of lost letters should open the letter.  Neverthe-
less, this could (and did rarely) happen.  In order to prevent the experiment from 
being detected, a suitable letter therefore had to be designed.  For experimental 
reasons the content of the letter had to be the same for all three addressees, have 
no allusion to religion or any other theoretically important aspect, and it had to be 
credible.  Therefore, a letter was designed in which a non-existing road construction 
firm from Zurich was informing all residents of the address in Bern that they were 
about to do some maintenance work in their street. 
4.2 Field work in study 1
The letters were distributed in the community of Zurich and in all adjacent commu-
nities.  This covers an area with more than half a million inhabitants (about 380 000 
in the community of Zurich and about 160 000 in the adjacent communities) which 
amounts to about 1/16 of the whole Swiss population.  This area is the central part of 
the urban agglomeration of Zurich with around one million inhabitants.  It is by far 
the biggest and economically most advantaged area of Switzerland.  Nevertheless, it 
shows some variance regarding the dimensions of interest for this paper.  The average 
socioeconomic status of inhabitants is high in the inner city of Zurich and decreases 
as one moves to the outer suburbs of the city.  Inhabitants of the southward adjacent 
communities tend to have a higher socioeconomic status than the inhabitants of 
the northward adjacent communities.  In addition, the acceptance of the “Minaret 
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Initiative” which was discussed in the introduction, varied substantially in the area 
covered by the experiment.  While in all the adjacent communities of Zurich more 
than 50% voted in favor of the initiative, this happened only in one district within 
the city of Zurich.  Though our sample is not randomly drawn from the whole Swiss 
population, it represents a wide part of the German speaking part of Switzerland.
Before the distribution of the letters started, we conducted a successful pre-
test with six blocks ( = 18 letters).  After that 125 * 3 = 375 letters were distributed 
in areas with a roughly equal number of inhabitants.  For one block of three letters 
the experimenters chose cars of about the same class (e. g., more expensive ones) 
and as close together as possible.  So, e. g. standing in front of a car with a letter, no 
other letter should have been visible to avoid making the finders suspicious.  Only 
cars that were licensed in the Canton of Zurich were chosen.  Apart from these 
guidelines, the letters were distributed at random over the whole area.
For each letter the exact distribution time, address and license number of the 
car was noted, together with a univocal code.  The code was hidden as the street 
number of the road construction firm in the letter.  This allowed any returned letter 
to be matched with the data relating to its distribution.
4.3 Results of study 1
Descriptive results of study 1.  375 letters were distributed over the analyzed area as 
planned.  Overall 193 (51.47%) of all letters were returned.  Most letters were found 
and posted within hours or within one day.
As expected, weather conditions influenced the return rates of the letters. 
When the weather was misty and rainy, the return rates were lower.  This shows that 
dropping the letters came with some cost.  On a rainy day people are not as willing 
to carry a letter to a mailbox as on a sunny day.  Because these costs were the same 
for each block of three distributed letters, they didn’t affect the relative return rates 
Table 1 Distribution of the finders’ backgrounds and return rates 
 conditional on finders’ backgrounds (study 1)
Experimental treatment Finders’ backgrounds Letters sent back
Frequency (abs.) Frequency (%) Frequency (abs.) Frequency (%)
Swiss native 157 41.9 99 63.1
Christian, non-native Swiss 100 26.7 44 44.0
Muslim 35 9.3 8 22.9
Unidentified* 83 22.1 42 50.6
Total 375 100.0 193 51.5
* Either the car owner could not be identified or the name could not be assigned unambiguously to one of the three backgrounds.
Islamophobia or Threat to Secularization?  95
SJS 45 (1), 2019, 83–105
for the different addressees.  More detailed analyses revealed no interaction between 
weather conditions and experimental treatment.
Eight returned letters were obviously opened and read.  Though it is not 
known how many letters had been opened and not redirected, this gives a hint that 
the content of the letters was credible to the finders (and readers).  So, overall, the 
experiment worked as planned.
From their license plates, 328 of the 375 car owners (87.5%) were identified. 
We managed to assign 292 owners (77.9% of the whole sample) unambiguously 
to one of the three groups: Swiss native, Christian background but ultimately not 
Swiss natives, Muslim background.  Table 1 displays the corresponding numbers of 
the letters returned, which vary considerably.  The return rates suggest that native 
Swiss have a higher propensity to send letters back than other subjects.
Tests of the hypotheses in study 1.  Table 2 gives the number of letters sent back de-
pending on the addressee.  For each group 125 letters were distributed.  It can be 
seen that letters to the secular control group were evidently more often sent back 
than those to the two religious groups.  If the two religious groups are combined 
46.8% (117 of 250) of all letters to religious addressees were sent back.  This is 
significantly less (χ2 = 6.54, p = 0.011) than the return rate of 60.8% (76 of 125) of 
letters that were sent back to the secular addressees.  This corroborates hypothesis HS2 
which states a general discrimination against fundamentalist religious groups that 
are not publicly recognized. 
It also demonstrates that the Muslim group is discriminated against compared to the 
secular control group.  18 (14.4 percentage points) letters less were dropped into a 
mailbox for the Muslim group, compared to those of the secular group.  However, 
the Christian group was also discriminated against to practically the same degree 
as the Muslim group, and there is no significant difference in the rate of return of 
the letters to the Christian and the Muslim group (χ2 = 0.016, p = 0.899).  Hence, 
discrimination was not due to the fact that the group was Muslim, but rather due 
to the fact that the group was distinctively religious.  This result clearly corroborates 
hypothesis HS3.
Table 2 Letters sent back conditional on experimental treatment (study 1)
Experimental treatment Letters sent back Letters sent back in %
Control group (secular) 76 60.8
Christian group 59 47.2
Muslim group 58 46.4
Total 193 51.5
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Because of the block-wise experimental design, there is no need to control 
this bivariate result for further influences.  However, to test the other hypotheses, 
a closer look at sub-group specific return rates is necessary.  Figure 1 shows that in 
contrast to hypothesis HT1 native Swiss do not discriminate more against Muslims 
than people without this background.
With the exception of non-native Swiss people with a Christian background, in-
dividuals from all backgrounds tend to discriminate against both religious groups 
more than against the secular group.  Yet, except for the unidentified group, which 
discriminates against both religious groups significantly, these tendencies are only 
statistically significant for individuals with a Muslim background.  None of the 
Figure 1 Return rates by treatment and the finder’s cultural background 
(study 1)
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11 Muslims to whom a letter to the Islamic addressee was assigned returned this 
letter, while they returned four of six letters addressed to the secular group (difference 
significant with χ2 = 5.43, p = 0.020) and four of ten letters addressed to the Christian 
group (χ2 = 0.34, p = 0.558).  This last finding can be interpreted differently: if we 
start from the above stated assumption that Muslims are a group of their own, this 
contradicts the identity approach of discrimination.  Thus, Muslims should not dis-
criminate against their own in-group but rather against some other out-group (from 
their point of view).  In this case, some other approach like statistical discrimination 
(e. g. Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973), possibly in combination with the contact approach 
(e. g. Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), that allows for the discrimination 
against the own in-group, could be a more appropriate explanation.  An alternative 
explanation may be that Muslims in Switzerland do not perceive themselves as a 
homogeneous in-group, though non-Muslims may assume this.8 Rather, individuals 
with Muslim roots might be especially aware of the advantages of a secular state, 
and thus might have rather negative attitudes towards fundamentalist religious 
groups.  This again would corroborate the “threat to secularization” explanation 
of the identity approach.  Though this last view corresponds e. g. with the above 
mentioned fact that there exists no overarching religious organization of Muslims, 
we cannot empirically decide this question with our design.
Finally, we inspected the influence of the sex on return rates and discrimina-
tory behavior.  Although women exhibit a 10 percentage point higher tendency to 
return letters in general, and tend to discriminate against both religious groups to a 
lower degree than men, none of these differences are statistically significant, at the 
5% level.  Nevertheless, this means that hypothesis HS6 is not supported: women 
do not tend to discriminate against religious groups more than men.  Rather, the 
opposite is true.
All in all, the results of the first study support the “threat to secularization” 
approach, for men but not for women.  Both, the Christian and the Muslim group 
are discriminated against to the same degree – even by individuals with a Muslim 
background.  What is more, we do not find support for the “traditionalist world-
view” approach. 
5 Study 2: Discrimination against Muslims where there is no reference  
to  religion
In study 1 we have established that Muslims are not more frequently discriminated 
against than another distinctively religious group.  In a second experiment, we ap-
8 Note that in the political debate this assumption is made by opponents of Muslims who treat 
them as an out-group, as much as by their advocates that want to protect Muslims against this 
out-group discrimination.
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proach the same problem from a different angle: we test whether people with a Muslim 
background are not discriminated against when they are not distinctively religious 
as stated in HS4.  By contrast, we examine whether Swiss people are discriminated 
against when they are Muslim (as stated in HS6).  While the “threat to secularization” 
approach of discrimination against Muslims would predict that both, religious Swiss 
people and religious foreign people, are discriminated against, irrespective of their 
foreignness, the “traditionalist world-view” approach postulates that foreign people 
are discriminated against, whether they are religious or not (cf. HT1).
5.1 Operationalization study 2
To construct our treatments, we combined names of groups with names of indi-
viduals.  To this purpose, we had a 2x2 design with the two factors religiousness 
(religiously neutral vs. religious) and background (Swiss vs. Muslim).  We chose 
Marcel Hubacher as a distinctively native Swiss name.  Muhammet Suleyman was 
chosen as the distinctively Muslim name.  The naming of the religiously neutral 
club («Verein zur Pflege alter Obstsorten» – Association for the Fostering of Ancient 
Fruit Species) and the religiously Muslim club name («Kulturverein Goldene Mo-
schee» – Cultural Club Golden Mosque) were the same as in Study 1, in order to 
keep the two experiments as comparable as possible.  So, «Marcel Hubacher, Verein 
zur Pflege alter Obstsorten» constituted the native Swiss name/religiously neutral 
affiliation condition.  « Muhammet Suleyman, Verein zur Pflege alter Obstorten» is 
the Muslim name/religiously neutral affiliation condition.  The native Swiss name/
religious affiliation condition is «Marcel Hubacher, Kulturverein Goldene Moschee». 
The Muslim name/religious affiliation treatment is «Muhammet Suleyman, Kultur-
verein Goldene Moschee.»
5.2 Field work study 2
The field work in Study 2 only differs from study 1 inasmuch as one block of let-
ters consisted of four rather than of three letters.  112 letters per treatment were 
distributed (448 in total). 
5.3 Results study 2
Descriptive results study 2.  Overall, 271 of all 448 letters (60.49%) were returned, 
which is slightly more than in study 1.  We managed to identify 359 (80.13%) of 
all car owners from license plates and to determine the cultural background of 323 
(72.11% of the whole sample) car owners unambiguously – similar numbers as in 
study 1.  Table 3 lists the numbers of the letters returned with respect to cultural 
background.  Swiss natives and individuals with an unidentified background have 
a higher propensity to send letters back than other subjects.
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Test of the hypotheses in study 2.  Table 4 lists the number of letters sent back by 
 addressee.  Visual inspection suggests that background (native Swiss name vs. Muslim 
name) hardly matters, while religiousness does.  Collapsing over group (religiously 
neutral vs. religious), 61.61% (137 of 224) and 59.82% (134 of 224) of the letters 
were returned to the native Swiss name and the Muslim name addressee respectively 
(χ2 = 0.08, p = 0.772, n = 448).  So Muslim groups are not discriminated against per 
se.  In contrast, collapsing over background (native Swiss name vs. Muslim name), 
65.62% (147 of 224) of the letters were returned to the religiously neutral group, 
but only 55.36% (124 of 224) to the religious group (χ2 = 4.94, p = 0.026, n = 448). 
This again supports the general hypothesis on religiousness HS2.
More detailed analyses provide similar results.  Among the non-religious addressees, 
we do not observe any difference in the return rates between native Swiss names 
(65.18%, 73 of 112) and Muslim names (66.07%, 74 of 112) addressees (χ2 = 0.02, 
p = 0.888, n = 224).  Also among the members of the religious groups, we do not find 
a significant difference (57.14% return rate for native Swiss names [64 of 112] and 
53.57% return rate for Muslim names [60 of 112] addressees, χ2 = 0.29, p = 0.591, 
n = 224).  So, HS4 and HS5, which both follow from the “threat to secularization” 
approach, are supported. 
Table 3 Distribution of the finders’ backgrounds and return rates 
 conditional on finders’ backgrounds (study 2) 
Experimental treatment Finders’ backgrounds Letters sent back
Frequency (abs.) Frequency (%) Frequency (abs.) Frequency (%)
Swiss native 153 34.2 102 66.7
Christian, non-native Swiss 148 33.0 81 54.7
Muslim 22 4.9 10 45.5
Unidentified* 125 27.9 78 62.4
Total 448 100 271 60.5
*Either the car owner could not be identified or the name could not be assigned unambiguously to one of the three backgrounds.
Table 4 Letters sent back conditional on experimental treatment (study 2)
Experimental treatment Letters sent back Letters sent back in %
Swiss/neutral 73 65.2
Muslim/neutral 74 66.1
Swiss/religious 64 57.1
Muslim/religious 60 53.6
Total 271 60.5
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Comparing the return rates of the two letters with the native Swiss name ad-
dressees, we find a tendency for discrimination against the addressees with religious 
affiliation (65.18% [73 of 112] return rate in the neutral and 57.14% [64 of 112] 
return rate in the religious condition), which does not reach statistical significance, 
however (χ2 = 1.52, p = 0.217, n = 224).  Discrimination against religious groups is 
more noticeable with Muslim name addressees: while 66.07% (74 of 112) of the 
letters were returned to secular Muslim name addressees, only 53.57% (60 of 112) 
were returned to religious Muslim name addressees (χ2 = 3.64, p = 0.056, n = 224), 
which again confirms HS4.
Taken together, this suggests that the cultural background (native Swiss vs 
Muslim) hardly plays a role, while religiousness does.  Still, traditional world-views 
may also play a minor role.  Discrimination of religious individuals is slightly more 
prominent (χ2 = 0.289, p = 0.59, n = 224) for addressees with a Muslim background 
(53.57%, 60 of 112) compared to addressees with a native Swiss background 
(57.14%, 64 of 112). 
Figure 2 displays the return rates for each addressee depending on the finders’ 
cultural background.  Regarding cultural background, our probably most remarkable 
finding from study 1 is the discrimination of the Muslim group by finders with a 
Muslim background.  In study 2 we observe a similar pattern.  12 Muslims were 
assigned with a letter addressed to a Muslim addressee (six to the secular Muslim 
addressee, six to the religious foreign Muslim addressee).  As analyses based on logit 
models (likelihood ratio tests for statistical differences between predictive margins, 
see appendix, tables A1 and A2) show, finders with a Muslim background tend to 
favor the secular Muslim addressee and to discriminate against the religious Mus-
lim addressee (although χ2 = 1.28; p = 0.258).  The Swiss native finders also tend to 
favor the secular Swiss addressee, and to discriminate specifically against the Swiss 
Muslim addressee (χ2 = 3.28, p = 0.070).  Evidently, both Muslim finders and Swiss 
native finders exhibit tendencies to favor secular members of their cultural in-group 
while discriminating against the respective religious members of their cultural in-
group.  This result corroborates hypothesis HS2 and HS3 as well as the “threat to 
secularization” approach.
However, HT1 and thus, the “traditionalist world-view” approach is also sup-
ported to some degree because Swiss natives in tendency even discriminate against 
the secular Muslims (33 of 44 letters returned, 75% return rate for the secular Swiss 
compared to 26 of 40 letters returned, 65% return rate for the secular Muslims, 
χ2 = 1.00, 0.319).
In contrast to study 1, women did not return letters more frequently than men 
in study 2 (59.6% and 58.2% respectively, χ2 = 0.06, p = 0.799, n = 332).  However, 
as shown already in study 1, men discriminate both religious addressees, unlike the 
neutral addressees (χ2 = 3.29, p = 0.07, n = 196).  They do not discriminate between 
the Swiss addressees and the Muslim addressees (χ2 = 0.07, p = 0.792, n = 196).  Yet, 
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women do not significantly favor the secular addressees over the religious addressees 
(χ2 = 1.67, p = 0.197, n = 136).  Hence, as in study 1, the “threat to secularization” 
approach explains the behavior of men, but not of women.  Analogous to study 1, 
we therefore find no support for HS6, which states that women will discriminate 
distinctively religious addressees to a larger degree than men, because they benefit 
more from the secular state.  Yet, for native Swiss women we find tendencies to favor 
their in-group, as it is postulated in hypothesis HT1.  To be more specific, using the 
secular Swiss addressee as a contrast group (26 of 36 letters returned, 72%), women 
discriminate against the foreign Muslim addressee (16 of 33 letters returned, 48%, 
Figure 2 Return rates by treatment and the finder’s cultural background 
(study 2)
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χ2 = 3.97, p = 0.046) but not (or to a lesser degree) against the Swiss Muslim ad-
dressee (22 of 37 letters returned, 59%, χ2 = 1.31, p = 0.253) or the secular Muslim 
addressee (17 of 30 letters returned, 57%, χ2 = 1.72, p = 0.189).
6 Discussion and conclusion
The methodological strength of our design lies in measuring real discriminatory 
behavior in a natural social interaction – doing another person a small favor – and 
combining this with individual background information to infer causal explanations 
for discriminatory behavior.
We find clear evidence for the “threat to secularization” interpretation of 
the identity approach of discrimination.  In the investigated urban area of Zurich 
in Switzerland, discrimination against not publicly recognized religious groups is 
pronounced, no matter if the groups are Muslim or Christian.  This holds for native 
Swiss as much as for finders of the lost letters with a Muslim background.  Aston-
ishingly, Muslims tend to discriminate against religious Muslim groups even more 
than against religious Christian groups, and more than native Swiss do.  If Muslims 
display no cue of religiousness, discrimination significantly diminishes.  Then, there 
is clear evidence that – in contrast to our theoretical assumptions – discriminating 
behavior of religious groups is predominantly a male behavior and is shown by 
women to a lesser extent.  Nevertheless, women also show discriminating behavior 
and even some tendencies of xenophobic in-group favoritism.
Our design does not allow for a conclusive explanation of the motives behind 
this behavioral pattern.  So, we conjecture that women might have a lower tendency 
to discriminate against religious groups because they have a higher propensity to 
be religious (Stark 2002).  Further, the results support our theoretical “threat to 
secularization” approach.  This suggests that Muslims who do not emphasize their 
religious affiliation will be discriminated against less in everyday life (cf. Maxwell 
and Bleich 2014, for France).  The fact that Muslims in Switzerland discriminate 
against the religious Muslim group most suggests that they themselves seem to have 
a rather secular world view.  This result is validated by a recent study by the OECD 
(2012).  This study finds that immigrants in Switzerland feel least discriminated 
against compared to all other countries which were also inspected (except for Luxem-
bourg).  It also corresponds with the fact that in contrast to countries of comparable 
size (like Belgium), history (like Denmark), and in other European countries like 
France, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany, there have been no terroristic acts by 
Muslims in Switzerland.  Equally, in Switzerland there haven’t been terroristic acts 
against Muslims as in countries of comparable size and history (like Norway) or as-
saults against Muslim individuals and institutions like in many European countries 
(e. g. Germany, France, Great Britain).  Also, there has been barely any exodus of 
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young Muslim men from Switzerland to fight for the so-called “Islamic State” in 
the present civil wars in the Middle East9.  And in the last elections of the Turkish 
parliament, in contrast to e. g. Turkish voters living in Germany, Turkish voters living 
in Switzerland predominately voted for secular representatives.  Overall, this can 
be interpreted as an at least implicit orientation towards secular values by Muslims 
in Switzerland.  This is also corroborated by a qualitative study about Muslims in 
Switzerland (Gianni et al. 2010).
All in all, one could say that until now Swiss society has been comparatively 
successful in integrating Muslims.  This happened by providing them with the liberal 
and secular frame of the Swiss state and the Swiss society on the one hand, and by 
insisting on this secular and liberal frame on the other hand.  Or, in other words, 
the fact that the secular frame in Switzerland is widely uncontested – and eventually 
overrules religious claims – might be an attractive alternative for Muslims who are 
about to lose their religious roots and are looking for another identity (cf. Joppke 
2015; Roy 2004).
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8 Appendix
Table A2 Wald tests for equality between return rates (predictive margins, 
p-values)
Swiss finders
Secular Muslim Swiss Muslim Foreign Muslim
Secular Swiss 0.319 0.070 0.606
Secular Muslim – 0.401 0.671
Swiss Muslim – – 0.228
Muslim finders
Secular Muslim Swiss Muslim Foreign Muslim
Secular Swiss 0.383 1.000 0.819
Secular Muslim – 0.383 0.258
Swiss Muslim – – 0.819
Table A1 Logit regression models – return rates among sub-groups 
( predictive margins)
Experimental treatment Native Swiss finders Finders with a Muslim background
Secular Swiss 0.750
(0.065)
0.400
(0.219)
Secular Muslim 0.650
(0.075)
0.667
(0.192)
Swiss Muslim 0.556
(0.083)
0.400
(0.219)
Foreign Muslim 0.697
(0.080)
0.333
(0.192)
N 153 22
